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ISLAMIC  CALL SOCIETY. Founded in Libya in 1972, the Islamic Call Society is entrusted with the task of missionary activity. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), under the leadership of Mu’ammar alQadhdhafi (who on 1 September 1969 overthrew Libyan King Idris al-Sanusi), has from the beginning designated the revolution as an Islamic revolution. Among the concrete measures taken to emphasize the Islamic character of the revolution, besides the prohibition of alcohol and the Latin alphabet, and the appointment of a Supreme Committee on Revision of Positive Law (28 September 1971, were institutional interventions that strengthened the position of Islam in the state and simultaneously placed it under the RCC control. These latter measures included the reorganization of religious institutions and the system of religious education, as well as the scope of the Islamic mission, whose meaning, goals, and structure were the focus of the First Conference on the Islamic Mission in Tripoli (December 1970). Through a conference resolution the RCC first entrusted the task of the Islamic mission to a Corporation for the Islamic Call, from which the Islamic Call Society (ICS) emerged. In order to implement some of the tasks set forth in the ICS statute, primarily the preparing of preachers and missionaries, the Faculty of the Islamic Call, subservient to the ICS, was created. Instruction in this faculty began in the academic year 1974-1975. Four years of study leads to the Islamic Mission License; further study may lead to a Ph.D. in Islamic Call. The students, numbering three hundred in 1980-1981, come primarily from Asia and Africa.


The ICS is directed by three organs: the Administrative Council, with at least five members, which plans and oversees all ICS activities and chooses a general secretary from among its ranks; the general secretary, who serves as the official external representative of the ICS (Shaykh Mahmud Subhi held this position from 1972 to 1978; since then, it has been the former education minister Dr. Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif); and the General Assembly, which meets annually and evaluates the work of the Administrative Council. The number of members on the ICS is unknown. The main financial sources for the highly endowed ICS budget are state subsidies, primarily from the so-called Jihad Fund (created by law in 1972). The general budget for Libya does not provide for the ICS, which is exempt from all taxes and duties, is subject to no restrictions on capital transfers, and has the right to work with any organization if this furthers the spread of Islam. The ICS, though an independent juristic entity with its main office in Tripoli, retains the right to found branch offices in other countries. One of the largest of these, in Paola, Malta, has been associated since early 1990 with the newly founded Islamic World Studies Center and the journal The Future of the Islamic World.

The Second Conference for Islamic Mission in Tripoli (14-19 August 1982), called by Qadhdhafi, produced a new institutional arm of the ICS when its four hundred participants created a World Council of Islamic Call (WCIC). Since its founding, Dr. Muhammad al-Sharif has acted as secretary ex officio of the thirty-six-member WCIC, which meets annually and is elected by the Conference for the Islamic Mission, which meets once every four years (third conference, 1986; fourth conference, 1990). The WCIC is concerned not only with the international dimension of the impact of the ICS’s role as a point of contact with the Islamic communities it supports worldwide, but also propagates Qadhdhafi’s version of Islam as an instrument of Libyan foreign policy.

Since the early 1980s, the organization of Muslims by the ICS (or World Islamic Call Society [WICS], as it has been known since 1982) into so-called regional councils (which have long existed in the Caribbean, West Africa, Central and East Africa, and South Asia) is part of an attempt to tie Muslims to Libya and to counter the activities especially of the Saudi Muslim World League with a putatively progressive version of Islam. In addition to sending missionaries and medical relief caravans and granting financial aid, the ICS has begun publishing books and brochures. It does so partly for purely missionary purposes (the brochures include How to Be a Muslim, How to Pray, Rules that Govern Fasting), and partly to blend a political and religious message (the books include Islam: The Religion of Unity, The Cultural Invasion: The Weapons of the Zionists and the Modern Crusaders). These are supplemented by three periodicals: the weekly newspaper Al-da’wah al-Isldmiyah, published from 1980 to 1992 (with English and French sections); the monthly Risalat al jihad, appearing regularly from 1982 to 1992, and occasionally distributed in English and French editions; and the scientific yearly journal Majallat kulliyat al-da’wah al-Isldmiyah, published since 1984-1985 by the Faculty of the Islamic Call. Despite immense expenditures, successful proselytization in Asia, Africa, and Latin American remains numerically limited; in Libya in 1987 some voices within the basic popular conference (especially in the spring of 1992) expressed displeasure and criticism of the ICS’s inefficiency, indeed to the point of discussing its dissolution.

The central tenets of the religious revolution, propagated by Qadhdhafi in May 1975, include the removal from power of the tradition religious scholars, the rejection of sunnah and hadith, the sole reliance upon the Qur’an accompanied by the simultaneous elevated valuation of ijtihdd and rejection of the four legal schools. Since the revolution, the ICS has propagated this interpretation of Islam abroad. According to Article 2 of the 1972 law concerning the establishment of the ICS, the main task of the ICS is the dissemination of the official Libyan or Qadhdhafian interpretation of Islam “all over the world by all available peaceful means.” The word “peaceful” was struck from the 198o revision of the law in reaction to the controversy with Saudi Arabia, which provoked Qadhdhafi’s call for a jihad for the liberation of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina and charges of heresy against Qadhdhafi from the Saudi `ulama’. The 1972 law cites, among other things, the following goals: the implementation of the Islamic Call Conference’s resolution of 1970; the spread of the Arabic language; the clarification of Islamic laws to make them conform to correct doctrine; the organization of courses of studies to prepare devout and cultured men of faith from the different Muslim nations (a task given to the Faculty of the Islamic Call in 1974); the preparation of propagators of Islam (a task also given to the Faculty of the Islamic Call in 1974); the reform of Muslim countries’ administrative, educational, informational, and social systems so that they are in conformity with Islamic principles and their policies and proposals stem from Islam.

The orientation of the ICS to foreign countries means that it carries out only limited internal activities. Religious instruction of Libyans is the task of the Qur’an schools and mosques; the construction of mosques is undertaken by other state organs. However, the ICS does organize Qur’anic recitation contests and is responsible for the production of a new edition of the Qur’an. The most important domestic activity of the ICS was proselytizing among the many non-Muslim employees (there were 439 conversions in 1980-1988) and financial support to foreign Muslims in need.

[See also Da’wah; Libya.]


Ayoub, Mahmoud M. Islam and the Third Universal Theory: The Religious Thought of Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi. New York and London, 1987. A somewhat apologetic introduction to the Qadhdhafian interpretation of Islam.

Mattes, Hanspeter. Die innere and dussere islamische Mission Libyens. Munich, 1986. Detailed study of the activity of the Islamic Call Society, with an emphasis on Africa. Includes numerous documents, most in English and French.

The World Call Society from the Second to the Third Congress: Report on Activities and Programs between 1/9/1982 and r1911986. Tripoli, 1987. Report on the activity of the Islamic Call Society, documenting the variety of its work.


Translated from German by Stephen R. Ingle

ISLAMIC CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. An organ of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is composed of federations, unions, and national chambers of commerce in forty-six countries, all members of the OIC. The ICC is comprised of a general assembly, an executive committee, a general secretariat, a president, and six vice presidencies representing the zonal distribution of the membership, with offices in Pakistan, Morocco, Senegal, Syria, Bangladesh, and Kuwait. The ICC is funded by contributions from member countries according to a formula based on per capita incomes. Proposed in 1976 at the meetings of the OIC in Istanbul, Turkey, the ICC was formally established in 1977, with headquarters to be in Karachi, Pakistan. The ICC serves to promote trade, industry, and agriculture throughout the Islamic world; preferential terms of trade for members; cooperation between Islamic nations in finance, banking, insurance, and communications; arbitration of industrial and commercial disputes; fairs and joint showrooms, exhibits, seminars, lectures, and publicity campaigns; and the eventual establishment of an Islamic economic community.

The activities of the ICC to date can be grouped in four categories: (i) building the physical and human infrastructures necessary for its operations, such as the headquarters in Karachi and a viable staff; (a) establishment of an institutional framework for the promotion of trade and commerce, such as fairs, exhibits, and the exchange of trade missions; (3) creation of committees and task forces to formulate designs and models and raise funds for joint industrial and manufacturing ventures in member countries; and (4) creation of the necessary organs to protect members against outsiders, such as the promotion and monitoring of the economic boycott against Israel and support of the Palestinian people and the Arab countries. The ICC thus only indirectly involves itself in business and commerce by disseminating information and facilitating contact among countries and trade organizations. An important organ of the ICC is its Information Bulletin, published quarterly in English and French to advertise fairs and exhibits; disseminate summaries of the proceedings of the general assembly and other official meetings; provide data on exports and imports of Islamic countries and Islamic companies (although the identity of the latter is not clearly defined); present occasional feature articles about member countries, the OIC, and the Islamic Development Fund; and publicize proposals for and news of joint ventures.

The ICC’s activities extend beyond its member countries. It occupies a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the United Nations Industry and Development Organization. It cooperates with the United Nations Council on Trade and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and it works more directly with institutions in the Islamic countries, both governmental and nongovernmental. Its contact with private institutions and businesses is particularly important, since one of the major obstacles facing the ICC has been the difficulty of persuading the private sector in member countries to cooperate with the public sector. Apparently the private sector is adequately served by national and local chambers of commerce and believes that any assistance or cooperation with the public sector could be confining and limiting to business activities. Furthermore, business enterprises in member countries are little prepared to identify with a confessional doctrine, such as Islam or Christianity, and the ICC is identified is an organ of the OIC. Ironically, most OIC members consider themselves secular and not bound by any religious or confessional policy restrictions. Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Tunisia, Iraq, and Algeria, for example, are members of both the OIC and the ICC, but all of them consider themselves secular states and willingly conduct most of their economic transactions with non-Islamic countries. Their own chambers of commerce are guided by business and national interests, not by religion. Where it applies, shari`ah (the divine law) relates only to personal status, while trade and commerce relations are extended to all countries, with the possible exception of Israel. Another complication is that the ICC encourages preferential treatment for contractors from member countries, which is not always consistent with the basics of private business, economic efficiency, and profit making. Still another restrictive factor is the implicit political orientation of the ICC. Its strong stand against Israel, overt support of the Palestinian Intifadah, and intent to prematurely promote an Islamic economic community might have limited its achievement.

Most of the accomplishments of the ICC to date have centered around meetings of its organs, the creation of committees and production of reports, and the construction of its headquarters. A few other tangible results include the establishment of a tomato-paste-processing joint venture in Cameroon, an oil storage and distribution venture in Mali, and the Tidekelt salt project in Niger; in the meantime the ICC has received more than seventy proposals for joint ventures. The limiting political character of the ICC is also indicated by the fact that it was created by foreign ministers of the OIC, funded by OIC governments, and is only indirectly influenced by business people. It is ironic, however, that in spite of its identification as Islamic, the ICC has no clear Islamic rules or regulations, economic principles, or philosophies and doctrines governing trade and commerce of the member countries. The ICC apparently takes member-country commitment to Islamic principles for granted, which obviously is not so.

To a certain extent, the functions of the ICC overlap with those of the national and local chambers of commerce, and more so with the international chambers in the member countries. The most obvious difference between the ICC and these other chambers is that the ICC is an organ of the OIC and plays a major political role among the members and in the international community. Except for the ICC’s objective of persuading the private sector to cooperate with the public sector, it would have been just as appropriate to call it simply the political-economy committee of OIC. Indeed, such a description would be fully representative of its economic functions, political orientation, and heritage as an organ of the OIC.

[See also Organization of the Islamic Conference.]


In addition to the following specific items, I have depended heavily on correspondence with and documents received from the national chambers of Algeria, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and from the International Chamber of Malaysia, as well as from the National US-Arab Chamber and the US-Arab Chamber (Pacific), Inc. I am grateful to all of them for their kind responses to my inquiries. Ahsan, `Abdullah al-. OIC: The Organization of the Islamic Conference. Herndon, Va., 1988.

Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry. International Bulletin, series 1981-1991. Particularly important for the summary of proceedings of the General Assembly.

Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Tasks and Achievements. Karachi, n.d.


ISLAMIC CULTURAL CENTERS. In 1973 the Suleymanll movement began to found Islamic Cultural Centers (Islam Kfiltiir Merkezleri Birligi) in Germany and other countries to organize labor migrants from Turkey and meet their religious needs. With 313 communities and about 18,000 members, the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers became one of the largest associations of Turkish workers in Germany. In I98o, there were also fifteen Islamic Cultural Centers in the Netherlands, nine in Austria, six in Switzerland, two in Denmark, and one each in Sweden, Belgium, and France. The influence of these other nongovernmental Muslim organizations has decreased, however, since the Turkish Islamic Union of the Office for Religion (Diyanet Isleri Tiirk-Islam Birligi) started to organize Turkish Muslim communities in Germany and other European countries in the I980s.

The Suleymanll movement, today with around 300,000 members in Turkey, originated with Sfileyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959). A member of the Naqsh-bandi, a Sufi order, Tunahan founded a traditionoriented, fundamentalist movement for the revival of Islam. It presses for Qur’an courses and for a reestablishment of the shad `ah and caliphate in Turkey. Like the Naqshbandis, the Suleymanlis are Sunnis and tend to the Hanafi dogma and the orthodox theology of Mahmfid al-Maturidi al-Samarkandi (d. 944). The Sfileymanhs believe that they can find enlightenment only through the mediation of Tunahan by the ritual of rdbitah (mystical union). The dogma is clandestine, known totally only by the shaykh himself and revealed partially to believers. The Suleymanli movement was forbidden from time to time in Turkey because of its anti-laicist tendencies. It is alleged to have developed a camouflage ideology, which encourages followers to infiltrate other groups and, for tactical reasons, to express views they do not really hold.

The Islamic Cultural Centers are organized strictly hierarchically as an association of communities subordinated to the Islamic Cultural Center in Cologne, Germany. Two basic structures are to be distinguished: the inner circle formed by the members of the Suleymali movement and the outer circle by the members of the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers. In I98o the Islamic Cultural Centers were accused, particularly by the German Trade Unions (DGB), of advocating Islamic fundamentalist and ultraright positions in their Turkish language papers while stressing in their German publications their desire for integration, cooperation with the state authorities, and recognition of the constitution of the Federal Republic. Since the end of the 1980s, some authors point out that the Islamic Cultural Centers are well accepted by other Muslim organizations, that the Islamic lessons they offer to the outer circle enjoy a good reputation, and that political concepts are propagated especially within the inner circle. In 1979 the Islamic Cultural Center in Cologne made an application for recognition as a “public law body,” but the application was refused.

[See also Germany.]


Gerholm, Thomas, and Yngve Georg Lithman, eds. The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe. London and New York, 1988. Collection of essays on the institutionalization of Islam in various countries and on the changes in the religious experience through migration.

Ozcan, Ertekin. Turkische Immigrantenorganisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin, 1989. Insightful study of political organizations and political orientations among Turkish immigrants in Germany.


ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK. The Islamic Development Bank is a unique aid institution, as all its funding is on an interest-free basis using financing techniques which are permissible under sharI `ah. It is a development assistance agency rather than a charity or a commercial bank, but, given that overheads are not fully covered, there is an element of subsidy in much of its funding. The paid-up capital in early 1993 of over two billion Islamic dinars was provided entirely by the governments of the Muslim states. An Islamic dinar, the unit of account, is equivalent to an International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Right, which was worth approximately U.S. $1.45.

Saudi Arabia subscribed over a quarter of the initial capital, and the bank is based in Jeddah, the kingdom’s main commercial center. The other major Arab oil-exporting states-Libya, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates-have substantial shareholdings and collectively enjoy majority voting rights, although decisions are not usually taken in this way. There are forty-five states which participate in the bank, all with either predominantly Muslim populations or substantial Muslim minorities, such as Uganda. Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia are the largest non-Arab subscribers, but Turkey has been much involved with the bank, and even Iran has joined in spite of its political differences with several Arab states.

Following agreement by the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Development Bank started operating in 1975. Much of its initial funding was trade related and short term in nature. As a result of the quadrupling of oil prices in 1974, many Muslim countries had difficulty in financing their oil imports and were in severe balance-of-payments difficulty. The oil-price boom may have helped the Muslim members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but it created problems for the more-populous Muslim states. One obvious solution was for the Islamic Development Bank to provide bridging finance, which would help both petroleum importers and oil exporters.

Using the principle of murabahah (resale with specification of gain), the bank purchased the oil or petroleum products on behalf of the importing country, which repaid at a markup, usually within eighteen months. The markup was well below commercial rates of interest and in line with the terms of concessionary finance from such institutions as the World Bank. As the repayments were denominated in Islamic dinars, this imposed an additional local currency burden on countries whose exchange rate was depreciating. This was less of a problem in the 1970s, when most deficit countries had strict exchange controls, but with economic liberalization and market-determined exchange rates, the costs of hardcurrency repayment have risen.

The attraction of murabahah trade finance is that the credit is revolving, and the bank can get its money back. As the bank is not a deposit-taking institution, and cannot borrow conventionally in international financial markets, its resources are limited to the paid-up capital which its members are prepared to contribute. If disbursed funding is not repaid and becomes bad debt, the bank will soon run out of resources to finance new initiatives.

The Islamic Development Bank has therefore been very cautious about long-term equity participation through musharakah (profit-and-loss “partnership”), and there has been little mudarabah (silent or limited) partnership finance in which one partner provides finance and another entrepreneurial or management skills. The problem is how to disinvest, especially in the poorer Islamic countries which lack stock markets. Equity participation has mainly been in government institutions, such as national development banks, or quoted companies, such as Jordan Cement.

Long-term interest-free loans have been provided for projects with a significant socioeconomic impact, usually involving infrastructural work, such as roads or irrigation schemes. Funding has also been disbursed for hospitals, schools, and other social projects. These advances are for periods of up to thirty years, with a service fee to cover administrative expenses. Over $750 million has been lended in this way, often in cofinancing involving other agencies, such as the World Bank or the various Persian Gulf Arab development funds.

Since the mid-1980s the Islamic Development Bank has concentrated much of its funding through installment sales and leasing (ijarah). Both methods of financing are permissible under shari `ah law. By 1990 over $600 million had been advanced for the leasing of equipment in sixty separate deals, and a similar amount had been offered for installment sale. Usually these arrangements cover a five-year period, although the bank is very flexible over the terms it is prepared to negotiate.

The bank has made considerable efforts to support the poorest Muslim countries, such as Bangladesh, Mali, and Niger, but finance is only one of many development constraints which these states face. The identification of projects with any potential in such countries is far from easy, and the local government officials are either unable or unwilling to produce well-conceived applications for assistance. The Islamic Development Bank, like other international agencies, has moved into the area of technical assistance in project design and implementation. Often such work is tendered out to specialized consultants, and the bank follows a highly professional approach to such matters, seeking independent external advice if necessary. It has adhered closely to its articles of association and not succumbed to political pressures.

In recent years the bank has taken tentative steps to harness new capital, develop internationally acceptable Islamic financial instruments, and build a closer relationship with the Islamic commercial banks. It has the potential to serve as a central bank for these commercial institutions. The Islamic banks portfolio was launched in 1987 in order to attract funds from the Islamic commercial banks and provide them with a safe yet profitable liquid instrument which they could hold. Over $65 million was subscribed, the money being used to finance Islamic trade on a murabahah markup basis with the profits shared according to muddrabah.

In 1986 agreement was reached to establish a Unit Investment Fund, and after three years of study and consultation with shari’ah lawyers the fund became operational. The Islamic Development Bank, acting as muddrib (manager) for the funds provided by Islamic commercial banks, invests both in Islamic countries and international equity markets. Shares can be purchased in London, New York, and Tokyo, but the investment must be in companies whose activities are acceptable to Muslims (halal). Electronics and communications companies are acceptable, for example. A brewery or other company engaged in the manufacture or sale of alcohol is clearly not.

Further initiatives are being planned. The Islamic Development Bank has examined the feasibility of an export-credit insurance scheme to encourage trade between Muslim countries and the creation of a multilateral Islamic clearing union. Growing interest exists in the republics of the former Soviet Union with majority Muslim populations. Some of these are expected to become shareholders of the bank, making them eligible for Islamic financial assistance. The Islamic Development Bank has become a well-established institution which is respected in international banking circles. Much has been achieved, and its role is likely to grow in the years ahead, both in terms of geographical coverage and in the range of Islamic financing facilities provided.

[See also Banks and Banking; Economics, article on Economic Institutions.]


Iqbal, Munawar. Distributive Justice and Need Fulfillment in an Islamic Economy. Leicester, 1988. A Muslim view of poverty and development problems.

Meenai, S. J. The Islamic Development Bank: A Study of Islamic Cooperation. London, 1990. Comprehensive, if somewhat uncritical, account of the Bank’s first decade.

Wilson, Rodney. Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East. London, 1983. The Islamic Development Bank is examined in chapter four and compared with Arab development agencies in chapter seven.

Wilson, Rodney. “The Islamic Development Bank’s Role as an Aid Agency for Moslem Countries.” Journal of International Development 1.4 (October 1989): 444-466. Quantifies the Bank’s activities. Uzair, Mohammad. “Central Banking Operations in an Interest-Free Banking System.” In Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam, edited by Mohammad Ariff. Jeddah, 1982, pp. 211-236. Relevant for the wider role that the Bank is seeking to play in relation to Islamic commercial banks.


ISLAMIC FOUNDATION. Established in 1973, the aims of the Islamic Foundation are to encourage research into the implementation of Islam in the modern world, to project the image of Islam in Britain and Europe, and to meet the educational needs of Muslims, especially young people. To implement these objectives, the foundation works with young people and publishes research, especially in economics and about issues of Islam in the modern world, Christian-Muslim relations, and Muslim Central Asia.

The foundation came into being primarily at the initiative of a Pakistani Muslim economist, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, who was a leading figure in the Jama’at-i Islam! of Pakistan. Ahmad was the foundation’s first director, serving until he returned to Pakistan to become minister of planning soon after President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq came to power. He was succeeded by Khuram Murad, another leading member of the Jama’at-i Islami. Both men have since become deputy amirs of the organization. The current director is Dr. Manazir Ahsan, who is not a member of the Jama`at. The foundation is registered as an educational institution under the British law governing organizations with charitable purposes.

Initially housed in a small office in Leicester, United Kingdom, the foundation moved into an eighteenthcentury mansion in 1976. At the end of the 1980s it bought a small conference center from the regional health service, some ten miles north of Leicester. This Markfield Da’wah Centre now houses the foundation and hosts courses and conferences.

The foundation traditionally has relied for its funding on gifts from wealthy individuals around the Muslim world, with some particularly large donations coming from Saudi Arabia; such a donation allowed it to establish the Markfield Centre. More recently, the flow of such donations has abated, and the foundation has resorted to more intensive fundraising methods.

In its early years, the foundation was involved in establishing about twenty mosques and community centers. It owns the buildings of the Sparkbrook Islamic Centre in Birmingham, although it has handed over the running of its programs to the United Kingdom Islamic Mission. The foundation was the first Muslim organization in Britain to establish cooperative relations with higher education institutions, working with the then Leicester Polytechnic on multicultural education and with the University of Leicester on Islamic economics. Ahmad played a leading role in the establishment of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham.

During the 1980s the foundation increasingly concentrated its efforts on publishing; today most members of its permanent staff are working in this area. Regular bulletins on Muslim Central Asia and on Christian-Muslim relations have been published, and a series of books for Muslim children continues to appear. The Foundation has published a range of books on Islamic subjects, including theoretical works and those relating to various particular regional situations. Islamic economics has been a particular area of concentration, and, currently, a multivolume English translation of Abu al-a’la Mawdudi’s large Qur’anic commentary is being published (1990-)

The foundation has taken the lead in encouraging Muslim youth organizations, and it has a close relationship with the National Association of Muslim Youth. The wider Muslim community perceives it as being an expression of the Jama’at-i Islami, although the links to the Pakistani movement are personal rather than organic. While large parts of the Muslim community thus have an ambivalent view of the foundation (when it is not one of outright rejection), outside the community the foundation has established itself as a major representative of Islamic interests and expression, especially in educational circles.

[See also Great Britain.]


Islamic Foundation. The Islamic Foundation: Objectives, Activities, Projects. Markfield, England, n.d. Nielsen, Jorgen S. Muslims in Western Europe. Edinburgh, 1992. See Pages 43-51, 134-136.


Azhar Niaz Article's Source: http://islamicus.org/islamic-call-society/

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